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A structured collection of tools for engineering resilience and a research approach to improve the resilience of a power grid are
described in this paper. The collection is organized by a two-dimensional array formed from typologies of power grid components
and business processes. These two dimensions provide physical and operational outlooks, respectively, for a power grid. The
approach for resilience research is based on building a simulation model of a power grid which utilizes a resilience assessment
equation to assess baseline resilience to a hazards’ profile, then iteratively selects a subset of tools from the collection, and introduces
these as interventions in the power grid simulation model. Calculating the difference in resilience associated with each subset
supports multicriteria decision-making to find the most convenient subset of interventions for a power grid and hazards’ profile.
Resilience is an emergent quality of a power grid system, and therefore resilience research and interventionsmust be system-driven.
This paper outlines further research required prior to the practical application of this approach.
1. Introduction
Power grids play an important role for modern society [1].
A failure in a power grid demonstrates a lack of engineered
and engineering resilience to one or more hazards. A failure
in a power grid may result in follow-up failures in the grid
and other infrastructures [2]. Bo et al. [3] mapped and sum-
marized 23 major blackouts from 1965 to 2012, representing
major failures in power grids. Among the surveyed literature,
no additional major blackouts were found, which is partially
validated by the list of billion-dollar weather and climate
disasters [4] in the US. Statistical studies show that major
outages happen more often than can be concluded from
statistics on minor and intermediate outages [5, 6].
Therefore, according to theoretical distributions and his-
tory of disasters, the world will experience major outages in
the future. The probability of an outage in a specific power
grid may be reduced by the application of resilience research
to improve the resilience of power grid infrastructures.
This paper describes an approach for resilience research
to improve the resilience of a power grid. It is based on
mapping existing tools for resilience enhancement in
a matrix-based classification for the follow-up targeted
resilience research. This paper is limited by the tools arising
in the literature review and so does not provide the complete
list of existing tools. The literature does not provide a way to
rank the tools for their effectiveness so no prioritization is
available.
2. Methods
Literature review was performed to identify academic articles
according to two schemas: functional and summary. The
functional schema facilitated the search for tools for resilience
enhancement, definitions of resilience, and experience of
blackouts. The summary schema enabled the identification
of summaries and reviews of resilience assessment frame-
works.
Search strings for advanced search in Scopus database
are shown in Table 1. The primary focus of this article is to
identify and classify the tools for resilience enhancement.
Other search topics provide context.
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Table 1: Strings for search queries run in Scopus database.
Schema Topic Query
Functional Resilience TITLE ( ( resilien∗ ) AND ( electric∗OR power∗ ) ) OR KEY ( ( resilien∗ )AND ( electric∗OR power∗ ) )
Functional Blackout TITLE ( ( blackout∗OR outage∗ ) AND ( electric∗OR power∗ ) ) OR KEY( ( blackout∗ OR outage∗ ) AND ( electric∗OR power∗ ) )
Summary Framework TITLE ( resilien∗ AND ( measur∗OR assess∗ OR indicat∗OR quant∗ORmetric∗) AND (review OR overview OR survey OR state ) )
Substation
Long distance
HV transmission
Thermal
power plant
Hydro
source
CCGT
132 or 33 kV supply
to local distribution
networks
Distributed
generation
Heavy
industry
Interconnected
grid
Step up 20 to
400/275 kV
Step down 400/275 to
132 or 33 kV
Figure 1: Generation and transmission network (UK voltages and practice) [7].
The functional review assumes that the search strings
provide source papers for an incomplete yet sufficient study
coverage of the topics. The functional search queries selected
source papers based either on matching titles (TITLE) or on
keyword values (KEY). SCOPUS allows an advanced search
producing a search engine results page with a set of tools
for filtering on the left panel. Using the database’s filtering
capabilities, the initial list of results was cleared of non-
English (e.g., German or Chinese), non-article (a peer-review
is expected for most articles), and irrelevant topics (e.g.,
medicine or biology). The toolbox cites 54 papers, reduced
from 174 papers.
The summaries’ review assumes that a reasonably com-
plete review of resilience assessment frameworks, for the
purpose of this research, is possible via study of existing
review papers on this topic. Papers for review were selected
by the relevance of their titles and abstracts.
3. Results
3.1. Power Grid. A power grid is a system that produces,
transports, and consumes electrical energy. Generators con-
vert fuels and other energy sources into electrical power. Step-
up and step-down transformation stations border transmis-
sion lines with substations in between. The UK power grid
uses several voltageswith 400/275 kV in the transmission grid
and 132/33 kV in distribution grids, similar architecture in
other countries. Accompanied by visualization (see Figure 1),
components of a power grid are listed below:
(i) Producer is a part of a power grid that produces
electrical energy regardless of the amount of energy
or stability of production. A hydropower plant, fossil-
fuel plant, wind generator farm, and a microgrid are
examples of producers of electricity.
(ii) Step-up/down substation is required to transform
current, e.g., from a producer's 20 kV to 400/275 kV
of transition grid and from 400/275 kV to 132/33 kV
of distribution grid.
(iii) Power line is an overhead or underground electricity
transmission line.
(iv) Substation is a station that transitions and controls the
power flow.
(v) Consumer is a part of a power grid that consumes
electrical energy regardless of the amount of energy
or stability of consumption. A factory, a distribution
grid, and a microgrid are treated as consumers of
electricity.
(vi) Control is a hardware, software, or organizational part
of a utility company. While control is not shown in
Figure 1, it is a critical part of a power grid.
3.2. Hazards. Mukherjee et al. [9] analyzed billion-dollar
blackouts in the US between 2000 and 2016, while Bie et
al. [10] provided statistics on of the major blackouts in the
world. While the lists of causes are slightly different, there
is a major difference in the distributions of blackouts by
causes between these two regions (see Table 2). For both the
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Table 2: Causes of major blackouts in the USA and the world.
USA The world
severe weather 52.9% equipment failure 47.8%
intentional attack 22.9% natural disasters 30.7%
system operability disruption 10.3% malfunctions/ miscellaneous 10.1%
public appeal 4.2% vandalism 5.7%
equipment failure 4.0% supply shortage 4.3%
fuel supply emergency 3.1% cyber attack 1.4%
islanding 2.6%
US and world the first three causes are responsible for over
85% of blackouts, 86.9%, and 88.67% respectively. Additional
research is required to explain the difference in causes and
magnitudes.
Type and intensity are the basic characteristics of hazards
when considering the resilience of engineered systems such
as a power grid. Type, e.g., precipitation, earthquake, and
intensity, e.g., 300mm in 24 hours, 4 Richter scale, differ
greatly but canhave similar effects, e.g., outage of a power grid
component. The impact of a hazard is at least infrastructure-,
technology-, and asset-specific. Hazards and their likelihoods
are specific to geographic regions, so despite both being island
nations, the likelihood of earthquakes is much smaller in the
UK than in Japan. A country-specific hazards’ profile must be
addressed during resilience research and for engineering the
resilience of a national power grid. For example,National risk
register of civil emergencies, 2017 edition [11] contains a list of
hazards for theUK. An analysis of global risks [12] is annually
produced by the World Economic Forum, Black Sky hazards
[13] were defined by Electric Infrastructure Security Council,
and academia also produces lists of hazards [14].
3.3. Resilience. In 2015, Fisher [15] mentioned the existence
of 70 definitions for resilience, although a list and analysis
of definitions were absent. 42 instances of definitions for
resilience were collected during literature review. These were
grouped by similarity and the group selected for this black sky
study was the one to include definitions from governmental
or international organizations likely expressing the need for
strategic decision-making, such as the US White House [16],
the UKCabinet Office [17], or the UNOffice for Disaster Risk
Reduction (UNISDR) [18].
The definition by UNISDR [18] is selected for this paper,
resilience is the ability of a system, community, or society
exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to, and
recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient
manner, including through the preservation and restoration
of its essential basic structures and functions. The intended
meaning is expressed in the analysis below.
This definition lists abilities, e.g., resist, recover; however
it does not provide a rationale for the completeness of this
list. This definition states that this ability belongs to an
entity, e.g., system; we treat the power grid infrastructure
as a ‘system’. This definition states that that resilience is a
function of hazards. This definition also states that resilience
is conditional, e.g., exposed to hazards, effects of a hazard,
and suggests either a secondary condition or an insight how
resilience should bemeasured, via timely and efficientmanner.
Resilience is manifested via preservation and restoration of
essential basic structures and functions, noting that not all the
entity’s elements need to be restored
From the literature, the following assumptions, abstrac-
tions, and explications were made for this paper, namely,
(i) A system has a normal and a disrupted state; a hazard
changes a normal state of a system to a disrupted
state. Resilience is the ability of an entity to execute
the opposite transition, namely, from a disrupted state
to a normal state, or to prevent a transition into a
disrupted state.
(ii) A shorter time period in a disrupted state indicates
a more resilient system, as is the ability to make a
faster transition from a disrupted state to a normal
state. Also, limited disruption to critical parts of the
entity and fast recovery of critical parts reflects greater
resilience to the scale of disruption caused by hazards.
(iii) Infrastructure is a complex system constructed from
many alternative assets utilizing different technolo-
gies that work on different physical principles. For the
purposes of this paper we assume a predetermined
power grid configuration. Therefore, the manifesta-
tion of resilience is the preservation or recovery of
basic functions. Basic functions are available to the
customers in volume through time in locations.
(iv) Time, volume and location are possible input data
for resilience assessment although location is mostly
disregarded in this paper as it is focused on resilience
of a whole infrastructure instead of its parts and the
lack of theoretical means to address physical and
likely multilayered virtual subgrids.
In a normal state, an infrastructure delivers a normal volume
of basic functions, while an infrastructure in a disrupted
state, in comparison to expected delivery in a normal state,
delivers a reduced volume. A normal output is delivered by an
infrastructure working in normal conditions, while the same
infrastructure under a pressure of a hazard delivers a smaller
volume. The nearer the volume to the normal output volume
under pressure by a hazard, the greater the resilience, and the
smaller the difference between the outputs; see Figure 2.
3.4. Resilience Assessment. Hosseini et al. [19] provide a
classification of approaches to resilience assessment. The
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Figure 2: Three simplified hypothetical scenarios on the delivered volume in normal and disrupted states.
Table 3: Mathematical and conceptual representation of volume, time, and volume-over-time frameworks. ‘R’ means resilience value, ‘𝑓’ and
‘𝜌’ mean failure and recovery ratio, ‘v’ and ‘t’ mean volume and time, and ‘D(t)’ and ‘U(t)’ mean disturbed and undisturbed delivery value at
a time; encodings for subscripts, ‘d’ for disaster, ‘e’ for the lowest delivery, ‘n’ for normalization, and ‘o’ and ‘c’ mostly technical indicators of
the opening and closing the chart.
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general measure approach is used in this study because
it is quantitative and generic. Yodo and Wang [20] listed
quantitative resilience assessment frameworks for engineer-
ing systems, and this is used as the initial source of ‘general
measure’ approaches.
A system produces output over time, which can be
visualized via an area chart with volume on Y axis and time
on X axis. This generates three main branches of resilience
assessment, namely, (i) volume-focused that utilizes Y axis,
(ii) time-focused that utilizes X axis, and (iii) volume-over-
time-focused that utilizes X and Y axes. Most frameworks in
Yodo and Wang [20] paper belong to this category.
Quantitative resilience assessment frameworks use math-
ematical equations. For the ease of understanding the idea
behind a branch and an equation, representative examples
were selected from Yodo and Wang’s paper. Volume-focused
framework is referring to [21], time-focused is referring
to [22], and volume-over-time is referring to [23]. The
corresponding mathematical equations are listed in Table 3,
while Figure 3 provides a supplementary visualization.
3.5. Business Processes. Oneormore organizationsmaintain a
power grid and stable supply of electric energy. Just as a power
grid may be described by components (see Figure 1, [7]), an
organization may be described by business processes (see
Figure 4, [24, 25]). The business processes of an organization
influence the abilities of the organization to maintain the
resilience of their products, in particular the operate business
processes that focus on adding value to the customer. If
operate processes are able to ensure that the power grid (the
engineered system) is resilient, then the capabilities of people,
technology, policies, and systems (the engineering system)
that underpin these processes are resilient. Short descriptions
[26] of business processes are provided below.
Manage processes consist of a subset of processes formu-
lating organizations’ vision and mission, methods to achieve
those, and methods for effective utilization of resources. Set
directions focus on formulating the vision and mission of the
organization. Formulate strategies focus on identification and
definition of strategies to reach the vision and mission. Direct
business focuses on use of resources in actions to reach the
vision and mission.
Operate processes consist of a subset of processes that
deliver value to the customer. Develop product focuses on
designing the product or service that would add value to the
customer.
Get order focuses on finding customers and setting
contracts with the customers. Fulfil order focuses on fulfilling
the demand of the market. Support product process focuses
on increasing value of the product or service.
Support processes consist of a subset of processes ensur-
ing that operate processes are running.Manage finance focus-
es on having a sufficient cash flow. Support personnel focuses
on ensuring sufficient human resources for operate and
other processes. Manage technology focuses on creating an
environment without bottlenecks due to a lack of technology.
Corporate learning focuses on increasing the quality of
human resources.
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Figure 3: A disaster decreases the volume of delivery over time with the dark gray highlighting the impact of ‘under-delivery’ area, the solid
black line (D) indicating the actual volume, and the dashed black line (U) indicating that the expected delivery would not make the disaster
happen; encodings for subscripts, ‘d’ for disaster, ‘e’ for the lowest delivery, ‘n’ for normalization, and ‘o’ and ‘c’ mostly technical indicators of
the opening and closing the chart.
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Figure 4: Business process architecture, redrawn from Bititci et al. [24, 25].
The criticality of the different classes of business process is
not addressed; however, ‘value-adding processes’ have direct
influence on operations. However some non-value adding
processes, for example,manage technology, may have a direct
bearing on the ability of operate processes to function.
3.6. Toolbox. Components of a power grid (see Figure 1)
and business processes of an organization operating a power
grid (see Figure 4) are sufficiently descriptive for high-level
resilience modelling of a grid under operation. Together,
these categories form a two-dimensional conceptual space.
Tools to improve the resilience of a power grid may be
assigned to relevant cells in the two-dimensional grid based
on which component of the power grid and which business
process are targeted by the tool. The tools identified in the
literature review have been reviewed and allocated to the
grid (see Table 4). A dash in a cell indicates that there is
the absence of tools to improve resilience associated with the
business process (row) and power grid component (column).
Gaps may present opportunities for new tools to improve
resilience or may indicate areas where resilience is either not
a priority or has not yet been addressed.
Tools for improving resilience of a power grid are listed
and briefly described below. These tools were suggested or
mentioned in journal papers reviewed for this research.
Names of these tools are taken from the papers with minor
changes where needed to improve clarity. Tools are alpha-
betically ordered. The core idea of each tool is taken from
its respective paper, and a short description is adjusted for
the current paper or created when none is explicitly given.
Each tool is described according to the following template:
Name (abbreviation) [source] Short description. Statement on
categorization.
Some of the tools are mentioned in multiple papers,
yet usually a single citation is provided below indicating a
reasonable reference. Because of the specifics of the literature
review, it is assumed that the list of tools is sufficiently
representative, yet it cannot be considered complete. Some
tools are dependent on or are alternatives to other tools. This
has not been addressed in the respective short descriptions.
Another research may allocate tools into different categories,
as a valid deductive or cogent inductive logical and onto-
logical foundation have not been found nor created, and the
current allocation is intuitive.
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Table 4: Index of tools for resilience enhancement of a power grid; tools are referred as abbreviations of their names.
Process Component
Producer Substation Power line Substation Consumer Control
Set directions - - - - - -
Formulate strategies - RAT, RET RAT, RET RAT, RET - CP, OR, RAT, RET
Direct business IB - - - -
CP, DA, DP, DF, DMG,
MAF, OM, PI, RSA, RM,
RP
Get order - - - - - -
Develop product - - - - AC -
Fulfil order DIG, GG, MEG, MG, PP,RCUC, TESS MUT - -
BP, DSM,
LS, MG
CS, CI, DSM, DIA, LS, MG,
NR, pMEG, PP, PSS,
RCUC, RSA, SG, SM
Support product - - - - AC -
Manage finance - - - - - -
Support personnel - - - - - CRS
Manage technology GG, MG, RS RAT, RET,RS, R&D
MV, OS,
RAT, RET,
RS, UL
MO, OS,
RAT, RET,
RS
MG, RS
DA, DP, DF, MS, MG, MO,
PMU, PI, PSS, RAT, RET,
ST, SCADA, SG, SD, SE
Corporate learning - - - - - BD, RD, SE
Assist customers (AC) [27] is with survivability features
at blackouts, such as backup generators, power storages,
or control components. This service is clearly associated
with the end-user's part of the power grid, and it might
be related to an idea for a new consultation service for the
industry. It is associated with the consumer component and
product development and product support business process-
es.
Backup power (BP) [27–29] improves resilience, mostly
in a form of gas-fired generators. A backup power source is
installed on the customer side and is an alternative means to
order fulfilment process. It is associated with the consumer
component and fulfils order business process.
Blackout drill (BD) [28] is a preparatory measure for
better disaster management. Blackout drills are associated
with the control component and corporate learning business
process.
Contingency plan (CP) [30] is a tool such as cutting off
consumers by a set of criteria to minimize economic loss.
Other types of contingency plans might be deduced for grid
operators and consumers. Contingency plans are likely to be
related to the control component and strategy formulation
and directing business processes.
Control switch (CS) [29]may improve resilience, e.g., after
receiving a signal from a smart meter a control software
switches to a backup power or changes typology of a grid.
This tool is associated with the control component and order
fulfilment business processes.
Controlled islanding (CI) [31–33] may improve resilience
of a power grid. The core idea is based on splitting a grid
into islands of balanced production-consumption, usually
to avoid cascade failure, minimize lost load and speed-up
restoration. Controlled islanding is related to the control
component (though producers and consumers might be
affected as well, and redesign of the grid would affect most
of the physical components) and order fulfilment business
processes.
Crew staging (CRS) [34] is a preparatory measure to
improve resilience. Crew staging is likely to be associated
with the control component and support personnel business
process.
Damage assessment (DA) [27, 34–36] provides the size
and extent of the damage and resources required. Damage
assessment is likely to be associated with the control com-
ponent and direct business and manage technology business
processes.
Damage prediction (DP) [34] is a preparatory measure
to improve resilience. Damage prediction is likely to be
associated with control component and direct business and
manage technology business processes.
Demand-side management (DSM) [37] is a process of
managing energy consumption. Demand-side management
is related to control and consumer components and order
fulfilment business process.
Disaster forecasting (DF) [30], if the industry is notified
about the disaster in advance, damage might be minimized.
Disaster forecasting is related to the control component
and business direction and technology management business
processes.
Disaster management group (DMG) [38] is used to man-
age the impacts of power outages. Groups in Germany are
formed from local fire brigades, administrative departments,
and a disaster management authority [38]. The UK has
similar groups in energy [39] and other sectors. Disaster
management group is a part of the control component and
business directing business process.
Distributed automation (DIA) [29] enhances the resil-
ience of distribution system via accurate and in-time control.
Distributed automation is associated with the control com-
ponent and order fulfilment business process.
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Distributed generation (DIG) [29] enhances the resilience
of distribution system via local sources of energy. Distributed
generation is associated with the producer component and
order fulfilment business process.
Gas-fired generator (GG) [40] is used for distributed
generation. Distributed generation is associated with the
producer component and order fulfilment and technology
management business processes.
Integrate black-start resources (IB) [41] may improve
resilience. It is associated with the producer component and
business direction business process.
Load shedding (LS) [42] is an emergency control action
to avoid cascade failure by cutting a subset of customers.
Load shedding is associated with control and consumer
components and order fulfilment business process.
Maintenance scheduling (MS) [43–45] may improve
resilience of the power grid. Maintenance is associated with
the control component and technologymanagement business
process.
Manage vegetation (MV) [41] is mostly by cutting trees
near overhead power lines. It is associated with the power
line component and technology management business proc-
ess.
Microgrid (MG) [46–52] is a group of interconnected con-
sumers and producers of energy resources that act as a single
controllable entity with respect to the grid. Microgrid may
be associated with producer, consumer, control components,
and order fulfilment and technology management business
processes.
Mobile emergency generator (MEG) [53] is used for tem-
poral distribution generation during emergencies. It is asso-
ciated with producer component and fulfils order business
process.
Mobile unit transformer (MUT) [54] is used during
failures of stationary transformers or their inability to process
the load. It is related to substation component and fulfils order
business process.
Modelling using IEEE bus test systems (MO) [33] and
many other authors have mentioned that IEEE bus models
are useful for evaluating for resilience changes to power
grids. IEEE bus is associated with substation and control
components and technology management business proc-
ess.
Mutual assistance framework (MAF) [27] has been set
up in Europe to aid restoration after major power disasters
with access to spare parts and workforces. The framework is
associatedwith the control component and business direction
business process.
Network reconfiguration (NR) [55–59] is as automatic and
dynamic change of topology of the power grid. Network
reconfiguration is likely associated with the control compo-
nent and order fulfilment business process.
Optimal reactive reserve (OR) [60] that meets demand
spikes under heavily loaded conditions allows the avoidance
of voltage instability problems. Optimal reactive reserve is
likely associated with the producer component and strategy
formulation business processes.
Outage management system (OM) [61] can dramatically
decrease the durations and sizes of power outages. Outage
management system is associated with the control compo-
nent and business direction business process.
Overhead structure reinforcement (OS) [62] improves
resilience of the grid, which can be achieved by use of robust
materials, optimization of tower foundations for soil type
and weather conditions. Overhead structure reinforcement
is associated with the power line component and technology
management business process.
Performance prediction of renewable-based resources (PP)
[63] improves resilience of the grid by overcoming uncer-
tainty and variability of renewable-based production of elec-
tricity. Performance prediction is associated with producer
and control components and order fulfilment business pro-
cess.
Phasor measurement unit (PMU) [64–68] is a device
that provides synchronized, real-time, dense, and highly
accurate measurement of current and voltage phasors. PMU
is associated with the control component and technology
management business process.
Post-incident investigation practices (PI) [35] are used
to study major outages post factum and improve recovery
for the future. These investigation practices are associated
with the control component and business direction and
technology management business process.
Power system stabilizer (PSS) [69] dynamically provides
supplementary feedback signals aiding power system control,
thus adding the grid's resilience. PSS is associated with the
control component and order fulfilment and technology
management business process.
Prepositioning of mobile emergency generators (pMEG)
[53] is a technique for optimization of location mobile emer-
gency generators. It is associated with control component and
fulfils order business process.
Real-time statistical analysis (RSA) [70] may identify
signals of an approaching blackout; thus utilization of this
analysis followed by blackout preventive actions aids the
grid's resilience. The real-time analysis is associated with
the control component and business direction and order
fulfilment business process.
Reallocate transmission routes (RAT) [41, 71]: a grid with
elevated or reallocated substations (and power lines)might be
less prone to extreme weather and floods thus more resilient.
Reallocation of substations is associated with substations
and power lines components and strategy formulation and
technology management business processes.
Redundant transmission routes (RED) [71]: construc-
tion of redundant transmission lines improves resilience of
the power grid. Transmission routes are associated with
substations and power line components and strategy for-
mulation and technology management business process-
es.
Reinforce structure (RS) [41] increases resilience of the
grid. It is associated with all power grid components and
technology management business process.
Research and development of transformers for resilience
(R&D) [35]: continuous R&D of transformers for resilience
improves resilience of the power grid. This activity is
associated with the substation component and technology
management business process.
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Resilience-constrained hourly unit commitment (RCUC)
[72]: this technique optimizes the loading of generators. It is
associated with the produces and controller components and
fulfils order business process.
Restoration drills (RD) [35] increase resilience of the
power grid. Restoration drills are associated with the control
component and corporate learning business process.
Restoration management (RM) [34, 73] may be used to
increase resilience of the power grid. It is likely to be asso-
ciated with the control component and business direction
business process.
Restoration priority (RP) [74] may reduce loss load thus
improving resilience of the power grid. Restoration priority
is likely to be associated with the control component and
business direction business process.
Satellite technology (ST) [75] may be used to detect
power outages in real time, thus improving resilience of the
power grids. It is associated with the control component and
technology management business process.
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) [6,
76, 77] is a data collection tool for control and manage-
ment of the grid. SCADA is associated with the control
component and technology management business proc-
ess.
Smart grid (SG) [10, 65, 78–84] is a more resilient version
of the power grid. A smart grid utilizes advanced data
collection and analysis. It is associated with the control
component (yet have physical and virtual sensors in all
other components) and order fulfilment and technology
management business processes.
Smart meter (SM) [10, 40, 55, 61, 84] is a device that
feeds data for dynamic control of the grid (e.g., production,
load). Smart meters are installed to all components of the
grid but are associated with the control component and order
fulfilment business process.
Standards' development (SD) [35] for utility cyber control
systems is a strategy for increasing resilience of the grid; this
can be generalized to development of power grid standards
for resilience. Standards' development is associated with
the control component and technology management and
corporate learning business processes.
State estimation (SE) [68, 77] provides a real-time state of
the power system, which is relevant for reactive and proactive
control of the power grid. State estimation is associated with
the control component and technologymanagement business
process.
Transportable energy storage system (TESS) [85] is pro-
posed for post-disaster restoration of large distribution grids
via initialization of microgrids and consists of an energy
storage, means of transportation, control of transportation,
and application scheme.
Undergrounding power lines (UL) [41, 71] could enhance
the resilience via replacement of overhead power as the
underground power lines are less prone to wind-induced
damage, lightning, and vegetation contact. The price of
higher installation and repair costs could be offset against
cost of damage or interruption to service. Undergrounding
is associated with the power line component and technology
management business process.
4. Discussion
4.1. Simulation Modelling. Volume- and time-driven resil-
ience assessment frameworks do not provide insights into
points of failure, triggers, probabilities of failures or triggers,
and asset conditions. These are highly relevant information
to link both hazards and tools to power grid components.
They are needed for resilience research and if a resilience
assessment framework does not address these factors, then
it has limited application. However, resilience assessment
frameworks that do address these factors are subsector
specific and, moreover, asset-specific and therefore have an
absence of a systemic and cross-sectoral understanding of
resilience. They would also require interdependency studies
and cross-sectors resilience-driven projects.
The need for generic and the need for specific resilience
assessment frameworks are a contradiction. This contradic-
tion can be removed by the abstraction between two stages
of resilience calculation. The system output is calculated at
the sector- or asset-specific first stage by the means of real
system or a simulation model. These sector-specific outputs
are processed by the same function into a generic resilience
values at the second stage.
Resilience is an emergent quality of a system to a hazard.
Due to the constructional and behavioral complexity of the
system of interest, the power grids, this emergent quality
cannot be predictedwithout a system.Ahazard and its impact
on the power grid from the producers to the consumers
increase complexity of the resilience research, while the
number of potential tools for resilience engineering and the
number of their combinationsmakes it a challenging research
domain.
It is impossible to replicate most of hazards in a real
power grid, and for many threats, testing is highly expensive
to emulate even on a highly limited scale if legal, e.g., a
cyberterrorism or electromagnetic interference, whichmakes
physical experimentation as a method for resilience research a
very limited application. Mental experimentation has limited
use for a conceptual study of resilience which attempts to
quantify the improvement from alternative interventions
and is an unreasonable method for resilience engineering
of complex systems using a toolbox. Post-event studies of
major outages may provide some important information and
insights, and the lack of observational capabilities on site
during an emergency can be overcome with multitude of sen-
sors logging power grid supply and consumption; however,
access to this data is usually limited due to organizational
reasons; it is a unique case that cannot be replicated, and
it is ex-post evaluation limiting its usability for resilience
engineering. Inductive reasoning is partially applicable to
resilience research as it relies on a strong and cogent selection
of facts, which is limited for the reasons above, similarly,
with formalization for the follow-up logical andmathematical
reasoning. Theoretical reasoning would be a method of
predicting results, but the theory for engineering resilience
does not exist; therefore, it is an inapplicable method at this
moment. Amodelmay selectively address the constructional
and behavioral complexity of a system and provide insights
into the resilience value of alternative subsets of tools without
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the costs or barriers of real-world experimentation which
makes modelling and especially computational modelling,
the most suitable method for ex-post and ex-ante resilience
research.
Banks et al. [86] classify simulation models as either static
or dynamic, deterministic, stochastic, discrete, or continuous.
A model for resilience research and engineering must be
dynamic since static models have very limited capabilities
in addressing behavioral aspects; stochastic as complex mul-
tidomain deterministic rules are very challenging to define;
discrete because continuous models are mostly based on
differential and integral calculus that if applicable has highly
specialized application, e.g., for thermodynamics. Dynamic
stochastic discrete models appear most suitable; however,
multiple formalisms for simulation modelling fit these char-
acteristics, and multiple formalisms might be used within a
complex computational model with some submodels being
static, deterministic, or continuous.
Some architectural considerations could be made for the
modelling- and toolbox-driven resilience research. It can
be safely assumed that resilience research would incorpo-
rate massive simulation modelling. A colossal number of
interactions between elements are expected. A state or a
change of state of elements before an element may result
a change of state in this element. A high-level and light-
weight computation is a preferred option unless required
otherwise. It is beneficial to represent a power grid as a
network of assets producing, transforming, redirecting, or
consuming electric energy, because it fits the typology of
assets and is efficiently computable within vector, matrix, or
tensor algebras and is applicable and partially transferrable
to modelling of infrastructures from other sectors that is
especially relevant for multisectoral resilience research.
Interfaces for control and information exchange model
and submodel are critical, as is parallelization of modelling
and computation to improve computational durations. A
hazard may affect the behavior of consumers, which is one of
viable research objectives, and it is commonly addressed with
agent-based modelling. Toolbox-induced changes in a model
assume the same domain language to describe assets within
the model and tools from the toolbox, and ontology can
address both the structure of the language and the database
of assets and tools.
According to Kelly et al. [87], five modelling approaches
are most commonly used for integrated environmental
assessment and management. Each of these approaches has
been used for modelling complex systems: system dynamics
[88, 89], Bayesian networks [90, 91], coupled component
models [92], agent-based models [93, 94], and knowledge-
based models [95]. In additional to the summary of these
approaches (see Tables 1 and 3 in [87]), Kelly et al. [87]
provided a heuristic for selection of one of these approaches
under standard application (see Figure 1 in [87]). However,
as is shown in review papers [96–107] a more comprehensive
heuristics on a larger spectrum of modelling approaches
would benefit the resilience research and engineering.
4.2. Toolbox. The toolbox is a collection and description
of tools to improve resilience of a power grid. A grid has
a certain level of resilience to a hazard, and by changing
the tools available to the grid its resilience may stay the
same, and it may be increased or decreased to the same
hazard. A change is based on intervention of a subset of tools
into the grid, and tools within a subset might be utilized
with a different intensity. Simulation modelling is the most
convenient method to evaluate the resilience of a changed
grid.
Power grid components and organizational business pro-
cesses are used to structure the toolbox, which currently may
be associated with a two-dimensional array, as a subset for a
change. A network-based model of a grid may also be repre-
sented with arrays. Therefore, this approach on a theoretical
level allows utilization of one of the most convenient and
efficient methods for mass computation, vector operations.
Vector, matrix, and tensor algebras provide a mathematical
apparatus for this and more complex computations, e.g.,
incorporating dynamics or multilayered virtual subgrids;
combinatorics and set theory could support scenario design.
Qualitative resilience assessment frameworks [19] which
could be used to direct attention to certain ‘cells’ in the
toolbox for these frameworks are based on best practices for
resilience.
Examples of such frameworks are a semiquantitative
approach proposed by Shirali et al. [108] qualitative frame-
works that could be transformed into a semiquantitative
index and subsets of resilience indicators proposed by van der
Merwe et al. [109].
The toolbox shows the areas currently lacking tools to
improve resilience. While this could be partially explained by
insufficiently full and systematic literature review, this also
indicated the lack of interest in this area, and if the lack of
interest is unreasonable, then the toolbox shows gaps in the
current state of resilience research and engineering.
While the current two-dimensional classification pro-
vides a valuable categorization for the tools to improve
resilience, it might be insufficient because it does not address
the constructional complexity of a power grid and its com-
ponents. The component dimension might be replaced or
extended with system’s representation (see Figure 2.3 in
[110]), systems engineering processes (see Figure 1.1 in [110]),
domain ontology [111], or systems holarchy [112], though
the latter is more suitable for grid modelling, but a strong
relationship between the holarchy and the toolbox must be
established beforehand. Other classifications might be used
as well.
Similar toolboxes could be created for resilience research
and engineering of other sectors of infrastructure. Mul-
tisectoral toolboxes would require an additional research,
probably resulting in a higher-dimensionality of classification
matrices and generic functional-constructional descriptors of
tools.
4.3. Resilience Value. Most of the general quantitative resil-
ience assessment frameworks in [19, 20] utilize volume, time,
or volume-over-time data to calculate resilience value. These
variables and different operators from different branches of
mathematics form alternative mathematical equations for
calculation of resilience value. Each equation is supported by
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Table 5: A temporal outlook to disruptive events [8]. Relative to a disruptive event, resilience may be improved long before, before, during,
after, and long after the event.
Time period Objectives System state System function Event feature
Long before
Identify possible events, know
system weaknesses, plan response
and restoration, prepare resources
Normal
Awareness,
planning, and
preparation
Predisposition
Before
Monitor system, monitor threats,
ensure resources are available,
switch to alert state if a threat is
detected
Alert Monitor, detect,recognition Precursors
During Stop effect propagation, core goals,manage cascade failures Emergency
Containment,
mitigation Effects
After
Resume normal operations, reverse
alert/emergency, manage delayed
failures
Restoration
Repair,
reconfigure,
replacement
Impact
Long after
Understand what happened, know
why it happened, plan and
implement actions to improve
resilience
Recovery
Reflection,
learning,
improvement
Outcome
at least one line of argumentation which could be probed and
developed further. Other ideas may and would likely result
from other equations, for example,
(1) Minimum resilience value is taken as the resilience of
the system, and the volume might now be the lowest
delivery. Resilience value is calculated for each time
value at the first step, and the minimum resilience
value is selected at the second step.
(2) Lowest (minimum) delivery volume defines the
resilience of the system. The minimum value is
selected for the equation with the associated time and
this time is used to select the baseline value.
(3) This equation can be further extended by incorporat-
ing more statistical values:
(a) mean (the average) of delivered and baseline
volume during at disrupted state,
(b) median (the middle value of an ordered list) of
volume,
(c) mode (the most common value),
(d) filtering out outliers with the calculation of
averages (or minimum, as above),
(e) using other statistical measures and statistical
analysis techniques, e.g., quartiles with the asso-
ciated box-and-whisker plots.
(4) Statistics may provide additional insights. For exam-
ple, skewness may indicate whether the system fails or
recovers faster, while kurtosis may indicate whether
the system has extreme drops of performance or how
fast the hardest part of the system is processed.While
these can be easily deduced from the visualization, the
quantitative statistical technique is instrumental for
automatic optimization of the infrastructure.
An equation can be used on natural (e.g., litres) and nor-
malized (e.g., percent) data. Some considerations might
require nonlinear normalization (e.g., onto a logarithmic
scale for similar reasons the Richter magnitude scale is a
logarithmic scale) of the input data or resilience values,
in this case an equation might undergo adjustments. The
nonlinear normalization might be the answer to the intensity
aspect of the hazards’ profile, but this requires additional re-
search.
The significance of each tool in isolation with respect
to resilience improvement is questionable unless a sound
logical and pragmatic reasoning is provided; usually, papers
are lacking in that aspect. In the event the toolbox is applied
for resilience research, then one or more equations would
be selected, combined, and developed. Simulation modelling
would support any tool and related equations, subject to
limitations of the platform.
4.4. Decision-Making. Several preconditions must be met
before application of a resilience assessment framework as
resilience values are calculated for strategic decision-making
and operationalization of the decisions. If resilience value
is insufficient, then a change might be introduced into the
system resulting in a new resilience value of the changed
system. The difference between the old and new resilience
values represents the impact of the change on resilience, and
the delta resilience might be compared to delta sustainability
or monetary investment.
Overall, resilience engineering is likely a continuous
activity and resilience of a complex system can be addressed
at different stages to disruptive events; see Table 5.
Multiple methods can be used to define the criteria to
consider whether the output of each resilience assessment
framework indicates a ‘good’ level of resilience. If resilience
value is used for decision-making, it is multicriteria decision-
making, and thus this task is about naming complemen-
tary criteria for the multicriteria decision-making. Three
approaches to multicriteria decision-making are listed below
from the least to the most comprehensive.
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Single criteria indicators: with resilience value as sup-
ply/demand ratio, the criteria are the threshold value for the
volume of delivery or capacity margin.
Multicriteria n-lemmas: an example of such concept is
a well-known cost–quality–time triangle with a heuristics
rule that for any system it is possible to meet two quali-
ties only. Similar triangle is associated with the resilience
of electricity system [113] presenting sustainability–security
of supply–affordability triangle, where resilience is a part
of security and decarbonization is a part of sustainability
indicators.
Evaluation frameworks: HM treasury provides guidance
on how to appraise and evaluate policies, projects, and
programmes; see The Green Book [114].
5. Conclusions
A structured collection of tools for engineering resilience and
an approach for resilience research to improve the resilience
of a power grid infrastructure is described in this paper.
The collection is a two-dimensional array formed from a
classification of components of a power grid and a typology of
business processes. These two dimensions provide a physical
and operational outlook for a power grid. The approach
for resilience research is based on building a simulation
model for a power grid which utilizes a resilience assessment
equation to assess its baseline resilience to a hazards profile,
then iteratively selecting a subset of tools from the collection
and introducing these as interventions in the power grid
simulation. Calculating the difference in resilience associated
with each subset supports multicriteria decision-making to
find the most convenient subset of interventions for a power
grid and hazards profile.
This highlights the importance of a portfolio which is
strategies which should take account of variety of natural
disasters relevant to the regions/geographical areas of the
power grid (in addition to general hazards), as well as
compensating for design decisions which can compromise
resilience.
The approach outlined of iterative testing of subsets of
tools assumes simulation modelling. The simulation model
should be in-line with the structured description of the
elements of the collection and the possible paths of impact
of hazards. Hazard is a mandatory element of resilience
experience; however, resilience of a system to a hazard is
less relevant then resilience of a system to a hazards’ profile.
Matrix algebra, set theory, and combinatorics allow automatic
construction of scenarios within this approach. Volume,
time, or volume-over-time resilience assessment framework
could be selected or designed for the simulation modelling
architecture. The resulting resilience value, in combination
with other factors, could be used for multicriteria decision-
making on the quality of the subset.
Resilience is an emergent quality of a power grid system,
and therefore resilience research and interventions must be
system-driven. Usually, multiple infrastructures are utilized
by social or production systems, and a hazard often affects
multiple infrastructures as well-illustrated by assessment of
volcanic hazards by Wilson et al. [115], which also states
the importance of hazards’ profile for a country. More-
over, interdependencies [1, 2] between infrastructures may
impact the recovery and resilience of a single infrastruc-
ture. Therefore, simulation-based search/optimization for a
resilient infrastructure would benefit from a simultaneous
search/optimization for multisectoral resilience; e.g., Najafi
et al. [52] described resilience improvement of power-water
distribution system. However, simulation-based resilience
research and engineering require in-depth single- or multi-
topic analysis of hazards, infrastructure components, vulner-
abilities, tools, regions, simulation modelling techniques, and
search or optimization algorithms for the follow-up model
driven resilience research and engineering.
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